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ABSTRACT: The Price equation is currently considered one of the fundamental equations –or even 
the fundamental equation– of evolution. In this article, we explore the role of this equation within 
cultural evolutionary theory. More specifically, we use it to account for the explanatory power and 
the theoretical structure of a certain generalised version of dual-inheritance theory. First, we argue 
that, in spite of not having a definite empirical content, the Price equation offers a suitable 
formalisation of the processes of cultural evolution, and provides a powerful heuristic device for 
discovering the actual causes of cultural change and accumulation. Second, we argue that, as a 
consequence of this, a certain version of the Price equation is the fundamental law of cultural 
evolutionary theory. In order to support this claim, we sketch the ideal structure of dual-inheritance 
theory and we stress the unificatory role that the Price equation plays in it.  
KEYWORDS: Cultural evolutionary theory; Price equation; Dual-inheritance theory; Fundamental 
laws; Metatheoretical structuralism.   
 
RESUMEN: La ecuación de Price es actualmente considerada una de las ecuaciones 
fundamentales –o incluso la ecuación fundamental– de la evolución. En el presente artículo 
exploramos el papel de dicha ecuación dentro de la teoría de la evolución cultural. En concreto, 
usamos la ecuación de Price para analizar la capacidad explicativa y la estructura teórica de una 
versión general de la teoría de la herencia dual. En primer lugar, argumentamos que a pesar de 
carecer de un contenido empírico definido, la ecuación de Price ofrece una adecuada formalización 
de los procesos de evolución cultural y ofrece una poderosa herramienta heurística para el 
descubrimiento de las causas concretas del cambio y acumulación cultural. En segundo lugar, 
argumentamos que, como consecuencia de esto, una cierta versión de la ecuación de Price es la ley 
fundamental de la teoría de la evolución cultural. Para defender esta afirmación delineamos la 
estructura ideal de la teoría de la herencia dual y enfatizamos el papel unificador que la ecuación 
de Price juega en ella. 
 
PALABRAS CLAVE: Teoría de la evolución cultural; Ecuación de Price; Teoría de la herencia 
dual; Leyes fundamentales; Estructuralismo Metateórico. 
 
SHORT SUMMARY: In this article, we explore the role of the Price equation within cultural 
evolutionary theory. First, we argue that the Price equation provides a powerful heuristic device for 
discovering the actual causes of cultural change and accumulation. Second, we argue that, for this 






Formulated at the beginning of the 1970s by population geneticist George Price, the Price equation 
was initially received with scepticism by most evolutionary biologists, due to its highly abstract and 
general character. Yet –as many projects of extension of Darwinism to social evolution started 
emerging in the following decades– this apparent defect turned out to be one of its major strengths. 
Nowadays, some authors look at the Price equation as the key for a generalised theory of evolution 
(Frank, 2017). In this article, we shall argue that the Price equation –or, at least, a version of it– is 
the fundamental law of cultural evolutionary theory.  
 In order to support this claim, we shall consider two issues. The first one is genuinely theoretical. 
Cultural evolutionists have identified, throughout the last decades, a set of evolutionary factors 
responsible for cultural change. In section 2, we shall shortly summarise them. The question is: may 
the Price equation properly represent the causes of cultural evolution? After having introduced in 
some detail the Price equation in section 3, we shall argue –in section 4– that it is possible to answer 
affirmatively to this question.  
 The second issue that we shall consider says about the empirical import of the Price equation. 
Even accepting that the formal descriptions of cultural evolutionary forces can be accommodated 
within the Price equation, this does not entail that we can satisfactorily employ the equation for 
explanatory or predictive goals. This is a special case of a more general concern related to the Price 
equation, namely, that the equation is no more than a mathematical identity and, thus, its practical 
usefulness is dubious (van Veelen, 2005). We shall attempt to respond to this concern in two parts.  
 First, in section 5, we shall concede to the critics that the Price equation alone does not directly 
convey any causal information. Still, we shall argue that if, in a specific scenario, we are able to 
identify at least some evolutionary forces, then we can employ the Price equation to provide 
hypotheses about the presence of other causes of evolution and its characteristics. We shall illustrate 
this point through three main case studies (MacCallum et al, 2012; Aguilar and Akçay, 2018; Gong 
et al, 2012).  
 If we compare the Price equation to other “fundamental laws” in physics and biology, like 
Newton’s second law or the “principle of natural selection” (Brandon, 1982), we can easily 
appreciate that they all are merely consequence laws (Sober, 1984) –that is, they do not have a causal 
import– and they are almost empirical vacuous (Díez and Lorenzano, 2013) –i.e., they are little more 
than identities. Therefore, what the critics consider a defect of the Price equation is, on the contrary, 
a trait that this equation shares with some of the most important laws in the history of science 
(Luque, 2017; Luque and Baravalle, 2021). It is what Kuhn (1970) called a “generalisation-sketch” 
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and Moulines (1984) a “guiding-principle”: a heuristic principle that provides a working scheme for 
developing the further details of the theory. 
 We shall fully characterise the Price equation as the fundamental law of cultural evolutionary 
theory –by employing some conceptual resources of metatheoretical structuralism (Balzer et al, 
1987)– in section 6. In doing so, we shall also tentatively depict the overall structure of cultural 
evolutionary theory. We think that this is an important task, since –if attained– it would be evidence 
that cultural evolutionary theory is somehow unitarily grounded; a claim that has recently been 
challenged (e.g., Lewens, 2015).  
 
2. A short overview of cultural evolutionary theory 
In accordance with a largely shared view, the core of cultural evolutionary theory is constituted by 
the models that Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981), Boyd and Richerson (1985) and their 
collaborators (especially Joseph Henrich, 2001, 2004) built within the so-called dual-inheritance 
theory.1 According to dual-inheritance theory, culture is differential transmission and accumulation 
of learned information. What kind of information is transmitted and accumulated in human cultures 
is largely dependent on our hard-wired preferences for certain kinds of behaviour. Genetic evolution 
provided human beings with characteristic social learning biases that have proven adaptive in 
relatively stable environments, wherein individual trial-and-error learning is unnecessarily costly. 
They are the disproportionate imitation/emulation of the most common type (conformism), of the 
most successful type (model-based or prestige biases), and of the most psychologically attractive, 
memorable or useful type (content biases).2 Conformism and model-based biases are sometimes 
also called “context-based biases”. 
 Our cognitive preferences contribute to determine the distributions of cultural variants (like 
artefacts, beliefs, items of knowledge, words, symbols, skills, norms, rituals, etc.). In dual-
inheritance theory, cultural variants are usually considered as a class of psychological or behavioural 
 
1 There are alternative conceptions which dispute the centrality of dual-inheritance theory within 
cultural evolutionary theory (e.g., cultural epidemiology; Claidière et al, 2014). While our intuition 
is that the Price equation may play a foundational role in these conceptions as well, we shall not 
discuss them here. As correctly pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, sometimes the paternity of 
dual-inheritance theory is attributed to Lumsden and Wilson (2005[1981]). Although we 
acknowledge that Lumsden and Wilson’s work has numerous affinities with Cavalli-Sforza and 
Feldman’s and Boyd and Richerson’s, the former has been less influential for the following 
development of the theory. For this reason, we will not take it into account here. 
2 This picture has been somehow complexified by recent research (see, for instance, Kendal et al, 
2018). For simplicity, we shall not take into account such developments; yet, we think that they may 
be easily accommodated to the framework we are going to defend here. 
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phenotypic traits, whose specificity is, precisely, that they are culturally transmitted.3 Since the 
successful transmission of cultural variants depends on the fact that there are individuals who 
interact so as to satisfy their cognitive biases, it is possible to say that the distribution of a cultural 
variant is influenced by its attractiveness (due to content biases) and its previous distribution (due 
to context-based biases). Moreover, since cultural variants are a class of phenotypic traits, their 
diffusion may be also conditioned by factors that act in any other natural evolutionary process, like 
natural selection, drift or migration (among others that we shall discuss in more detail below). Most 
notably, natural selection acts in cultural evolution by eliminating cultural variants that are too 
detrimental from a biological point of view (i.e., this is the case of cultural variants that drastically 
reduce the survival or reproductive chances of those who adopt them). In spite of the latter, dual-
inheritance theory predicts a large degree of autonomy for cultural accumulation: provided that 
social learning is usually less costly or more effective than individual trial-and-error, partially 
maladaptive cultural variants may be maintained within a population, evolve and even subvert 
“genetically-coded” behaviours (classic examples are the evolution of lactose tolerance and the 
demographic transition in modern times).   
 In the attempt to systematise all the possible causes of cultural change, the overall effects of 
content and context-based preferences on the diffusion of a cultural variant are sometimes 
conceptualised as processes of “cultural selection” (Durham, 1991; Mesoudi, 2011). Some authors 
regard this characterisation as misleading (e.g., Claidière et al, 2014; Lewens, 2015). From their 
point of view, it is incorrect (or, more modestly, unnecessary) to characterise social learning biases 
as selective factors because they do not primarily act as sorting factors (like natural selection, which 
“filters” the fittest variants from the less fit), but rather as transmission biases (like meiotic drive, 
which causes the preferential transmission of certain variants previously to selection). As we shall 
see in the next sections, the distinction between selective factors and transmission biases is crucial 
for the formulation of the Price equation and its cultural evolutionary derivations. In spite of this, 
we believe that the choice of characterising social learning biases as selective processes or, 
alternatively, as transmission biases is largely conventional and depending on the modellers’ 
interests (as a matter of fact, also meiotic drive can be considered as a selective process, if we 
analyse this phenomenon at the gametic level).4 At any rate, and with the goal of providing a 
framework allowing a characterisation of cultural change as the result of both selective forces and 
 
3 Some cultural variants –like artefacts, written languages or symbols– are not, strictly speaking, 
phenotypic traits, but rather objects carrying information potentially influencing phenotypic traits: 
they are sometimes conceived as the elements making up culturally constructed ecological niches 
(Odling-Smee et al, 2003). 
4 On this point, see also Acerbi and Mesoudi (2015) and Charbonneau (2020). 
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transmission biases, we suggest the following partition (in line with Frank, 2012): if an evolutionary 
factor is able to modify the “content” of a cultural variant (i.e., its characteristic features, or the kind 
of behaviour that is related to it), then it should be classified as a transmission bias; if an evolutionary 
factor only modifies the distribution of a cultural variant, then it should be taken as a selective –or, 
more generally, “sorting”– force.5  
 In accordance with such a criterion, we tentatively put forward the following taxonomy (inspired 
in Mesoudi, 2011 and Baravalle, 2021) of the possible causes of cultural evolution:  
 
- Selective forces: natural selection, cultural selection due to content and context-based biases. 
Selective forces increase or decrease the frequency of a cultural variant depending of its genetic 
fitness value (natural selection), its cultural fitness value (cultural selection due to content biases), 
and its previous distribution (cultural selection due to context-based biases). (The notion of “cultural 
fitness” will be elucidated later, in section 4). Cultural selection due to context-based biases can be 
further sub-classified into a. Frequency-dependent cultural selection (cultural selection due to 
conformist preferences), and b. Cultural selection dependent on structural features of the population 
(cultural selection due to prestige biases). 
 
- Random forces: genetic and cultural drift. While genetic drift has an impact on the distribution of 
a cultural variant because it stochastically changes the number of potential transmitters of the 
variant, cultural drift is most properly conceived as the effect of the transmission of cultural variants 
 
5 In order to a avoid the impression that we are uncritically assuming a controversial point, some 
further remarks are needed. In the following sections, our discussion on the role of the Price equation 
in cultural evolution will largely rely on Aguilar and Akçay (2018) and El Mouden et al (2014). 
Their models crucially include a notion of “cultural influence” that is potentially problematic. This 
notion is supposedly defined in terms of the successful transmission of cultural traits. However, as 
observed by Jonathan Birch (personal communication), if cultural influence depends on whether a 
descendant is likely to acquire the same variant as the ancestor, then El Mouden et al’s and Aguilar 
and Ackçay’s models do not really separate selection from transmission biases. We recognise that 
this is an issue for these models (and, more in general, for those explanatory projects relying on the 
view that fidelity is a description-independent property of cultural transmission; see Charbonneau 
and Bourrat, 2021). Yet, we believe that this kind of problem can be conceptually distinguished 
from the ones that we aim to address in this article. To put it in Lewontin’s (1974) terms, a fully 
satisfactory evolutionary theory must be both dynamically and empirically sufficient. An 
evolutionary theory is dynamically sufficient when it is able to provide, in principle, a causal 
characterisation of the factors involved in the evolutionary change. Moreover, it is empirically 
sufficient if these factors can be measured and distinguished in practice. We may say that, although 
both aspects are fundamental for the explanatory success of cultural evolutionary theory, we here 




with equal genetical or cultural fitness (thus selectively neutral). Both selective and random forces 
may be labelled as “sorting” forces, for reasons that will be spelt out later. 
 
- Transmission biases: guided variation, random mutation, blending transmission. Transmission 
biases introduce variation in the process of cultural evolution. Cultural variation may be introduced 
by changing previous features of a cultural variant in a way that it makes it expectedly –but not 
necessarily– fitter, either genetically or culturally (or both). The processes responsible for this kind 
of directed variation are sometimes called “decision-making” forces, so as to distinguish them from 
processes changing features of cultural variants in a “blinder” way –that is, in a way decoupled from 
the increase of genetic or cultural fitness. Differently from the other transmission biases, blending 
transmission does not create a new variant nor simply modifies an existing one, but rather merges 
two (or more) existing variants in a new one.  
 
- Migration: demic migration and cultural migration. While demic migration increments the 
frequency of a cultural variant because more potential transmitters are physically introduced into 
the population under study, cultural migration is generally due to the presence of some technology 
(radio, press, tv, internet etc.) that allows the introduction of new cultural variants from outside the 
population without any physical displacement of individuals.  
   
 
3. The Price equation 
George Price developed, in the early 1970s, an abstract formula to represent evolutionary change 
(Price, 1970, 1972). Populations are composed by entities, usually organisms, which may vary in 
some characteristics. When these entities are exposed to the challenges imposed by the environment, 
some of those characteristics may help them to overcome the environmental restrictions. In addition, 
depending on the existence of an inheritance system faithful enough, these traits may be transmitted 
to the next generation. These two basic processes –that is, selection and inheritance– are represented 
by the Price equation in a simple algebraic language, in terms of covariances and expectations, as 
follows (Frank, 2012):  
 
𝑤"∆𝑧̅ = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑤, 𝑧) + 𝐸(𝑤∆𝑧) 
 
where ∆𝑧̅ is the change in average value of a character 𝑧 (in this case its mean, but it can also be 
adapted to represent higher moments such as variance, skew, etc.) over an arbitrary time step 
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(usually one generation), 𝑤 is the absolute fitness of an individual (calculated as the number of 
descendants), and 𝑤"  is the average fitness. The first term on the right-hand side is the covariance 
between fitness 𝑤 and the character 𝑧, and represents the change in the average value of 𝑧 due to 
differential survival and reproduction. Notice that, since this term is just a measure of the statistical 
association between the character and fitness, it does not necessarily represent a causal connection 
between them. For this reason, although it is typically interpreted as representing natural selection, 
it represents the effects of drift as well (Rice, 2004). The second term on the right-hand side is the 
expected value of the quantity ∆𝑧, which measures how much the offspring deviate from their 
parents with respect to the character 𝑧 (i.e., it accounts for the change in the value of the character 
from the parents to the offspring due to processes involved in reproduction). Thus, the second term 
represents the fidelity of the transmission of the organisms with respect to the character 𝑧. If the 
fidelity of the transmission is not perfect, then some evolutionary forces such as mutation, 
recombination, selection at a lower level of organization, or other processes, are causing a 
transmission bias.  
It is worth stressing some additional characteristics of the Price equation. The high level of 
abstractness of the Price equation allows it to model a wide range of entities and relationships among 
them. This lack of specificity is very useful for researchers. It helps them to think on different 
mechanisms of reproduction (asexual, sexual, etc.) and different mechanisms of inheritance beyond 
genetic inheritance, including epigenetic inheritance, or behavioural and symbolic inheritance 
(Helanterä and Uller, 2010).6  
Because of the lack of substantive biological assumptions, it is usually stated the Price equation 
does not involve idealisations (Godfrey-Smith, 2009) or that it is an assumption-free statement about 
evolution (Walsh and Lynch, 2018). As a matter of fact, although the Price equation actually relies 
on some minimal assumptions, these are not simplifying assumptions. They are instead intended to 
establish the basic properties of any evolutionary system.7 These properties can be summarised as 
follows (Rice, 2004, p. 169):  
 
- Change over time: To be considered as evolutionary, a system requires a population of 
characters changing over generations. In order to represent generations, we may use any 
time interval that is appropriate for the system under study. 
 
6 The Price equation is even able to handle blending inheritance (Gardner, 2011). 
7 As we shall see in section 4, some additional assumptions (such as the conceptualisation of a 
population as a closed system) are less fundamental, and therefore can be relaxed in order to 
incorporate more complex scenarios. 
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- Ancestor/Descendant relations: Different generations of an evolving population must be 
connected by some character. This is the basic requirement for inheritance. 
- Character or phenotype: Any feature of an entity that can be represented with a real number 
is, potentially, a phenotypic character. Accordingly, very different entities –such as alleles, 
genotypes, groups of individuals, etc.– can be interpreted as endowed with evolving 
characters. 
 
These broad assumptions behind the Price equation make it an especially good candidate for 
representing cultural evolution.8 As a matter of fact, these conditions are satisfied by cultural change 
processes. Cultures are changing systems, which can be profitably conceived as composed by sets 
of cultural variants –which, as we have seen in section 2, can be conceived as a class of phenotypic 
traits, or objects carrying information potentially influencing phenotypic traits– transgenerationally 
transmitted. Yet, the original Price equation does not say anything specific about cultural 
evolutionary processes. As a matter of fact, it can be arguably applied in many other fields outside 
population genetics (e.g., Alizon, 2009, Govaert et al, 2016), which is the field in which it was 
originally formulated. In order to support the claim that the Price equation can properly represents 
all the causes of cultural evolution (as we have depicted them in section 2), we shall now thus 
proceed considering two attempts to reformulate the equation so as to make it more explicitly 
suitable to account for cultural evolutionary dynamics. 
 
 
4. Modelling cultural evolution with the Price equation 
In recent years several researchers have used the Price equation in different ways to formalise 
cultural change. Some researchers have adopted the standard Price equation, redefining and 
rearranging its parts for specific purposes (Henrich and Boyd, 2002, Okasha, 2007). Other 
researchers, instead, have developed new forms of the Price equation, adding new assumptions in 
order to obtain a properly cultural Price equation. In this article, we shall focus on the latter, and 
especially on El Mouden et al (2014) and Aguilar and Akçay (2018).9 As we shall see in this section, 
both these works show that the Price equation is able to properly represent all the possible causes 
 
8 It is worth to notice that George Price himself intended the Price equation to capture a general 
truth about all forms of selection, not just natural selection (Price, 1995). See Rice (2008, 2020) and 
Luque (2017) for an analysis of further extensions of the Price equation framework. 




of cultural evolution. Still, in our opinion, Aguilar and Akçay’s equation is more accurate, for 
reasons that we shall spell out shortly. Then, in the remaining of this article, we shall preferentially 
take their equation as the correct formulation of the Price equation in the context of dual-inheritance 
theory. 
In their paper, El Mouden and collaborators start by matching individuals 𝑗 to a set of 𝐴! 
individuals of the previous generation that have had some cultural influence on them. They thus 
observe that, while the human genetic system of inheritance determines a fixed number of ancestors 
for each descendant (a human being always has two direct ancestors), cultural influence allows some 
individuals to have a variable number of ancestors. Some descendants can have a particular cultural 
trait that may come from different and multiple ancestors without any genetic relationship. 
Moreover, while genetic inheritance is “discontinuous” (in the sense that an allele is either 
transmitted to the descendant or not), cultural influence comes in degree (i.e., a cultural variant can 
be just partially transmitted).  
In order to properly model these differences between genetic inheritance and cultural 
influence, El Mouden and colleagues assign, to each individual i in 𝐴!, a weight Υ"! representing the 
influence that an ancestor has had on a descendant with respect to a particular cultural trait. Hence, 
by connecting ancestors and descendants by social learning rather than genetic parenthood, they 
define cultural fitness as “a measure of cultural influence, reflecting both the number of people who 
learn from an individual, and the degree to which their traits are influenced when they do learn” (El 
Mouden et al, 2014, p. 233), or 𝑐" = ∑ Υ"!!#$! , where 𝐷" is the set of individuals culturally influenced 
in the next generation.10 This implies that in cultural evolution, where social learning is the main 
vehicle of transmission, the degree of influence is as important as the number of people influenced. 
By assuming a constant population size (∑ ∑ Υ"!!#$!
%
"&' = ∑ ∑ Υ"!!#(!
%
!&' = 𝑁), and after some 
algebra, El Mouden and colleagues present the following cultural Price equation:    
 
∆𝑧̅ = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐, 𝑧) + 𝐸)(∆𝑧) 
 
where ∆𝑧̅ is the change in the average value of a cultural trait 𝑧. The first term on the right-hand 
side represents how much a cultural trait 𝑧 and cultural fitness, 𝑐, covary; and 𝐸)(∆𝑧) represents the 
transmission bias in cultural change, weighted by cultural fitness 𝑐. This new cultural Price equation 
allows these researchers to give formal expressions to concepts like cultural altruism (as a 
behavioural trait that reduces the cultural fitness of the actor, whilst increasing the cultural fitness 
 
10 See footnote 5 for some further remarks over the notion of “cultural influence”. 
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of those with whom the actor interacts), cultural relatedness (as the regression coefficient of the 
relationship between the cultural values of an actor and those of the people with whom he interacts, 
for a particular culturally transmitted trait), and to derive a cultural counterpart of the famous 
Hamilton’s rule (El Mouden et al, 2014, p. 234). 
Drawing on this work, Aguilar and Akçay (2018) have presented a similar formalism to 
model cultural change. The difference with the previous cultural Price equation is that Aguilar and 
Akçay include both genetic and cultural inheritance systems in their formalism.11 By doing so, they 
manage to establish one framework for both inheritance systems, tracking both genetic and cultural 
fitness in the same formalism. This is important because, according to dual-inheritance theory, 
cultural traits may be influenced by both genetic and cultural factors (see section 2). As a 
consequence, both genetic and cultural inheritance systems must be included in the same framework 
in order to predict and explain the fate of cultural traits. In this sense, Aguilar and Akçay gene-
culture Price equation is a generalisation of El Mouden et al’s cultural Price equation, while the 
latter can be considered as a special case when genetic components are negligible. Thus, Aguilar 
and Akçay present the change of average value of a behavioural trait (represented as a phenotypic 





𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤" , 𝑔") +
1
𝑤"
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑠" , 𝑐") + 〈∆𝑔!〉 + 〈∆𝑐!〉 
 
where the first two terms in the right-hand side measure the covariance between reproductive fitness 
𝑤"  and a genotype 𝑔", and cultural fitness	𝑠" and a cultural type 𝑐" (respectively). The last two terms 
measure the transmission bias in genetic, ∆𝑔! , and cultural, ∆𝑐!, inheritance.12 
After having introduced both El Mouden et al’s and Aguilar and Akçay’s versions of the 
Price equation, let us now check if they are formally adequate to represent cultural change. It is 
pretty straightforward to locate in the equations most of the different cultural forces discussed in 
 
11 El Mouden and colleagues develop, in the Supporting Information section of their article, several 
scenarios with cultural and genetic systems, but they never include both systems in the same model 
at the same time. 
12 In their derivation, Aguilar and Akçay assume that the effects of genetic and cultural inheritance 
are additive. That is, 𝑝 = 𝑐 + 𝑔 + 𝑒, where 𝑒 represents any non-inheritable effect due to the 
environment. Nevertheless, they also show how to obtain a general, non-additive, version (see 
Aguilar and Akçay, 2018, Appendix A5). A relevant precursor of Aguilar and Akçay’s approach 
can be found in Frank (1998, chap. 2). He points out, regarding the Price equation, that we can use 
any predictors for a character z (e.g., alleles, group characteristics, environmental variables, but also 
cultural beliefs, among others). In other words, anything that is transmitted can count as a predictor. 
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section 2. El Mouden and collaborators explicitly locate cultural selection in the covariance term. 
Analogously, Aguilar and Akçay locate selection (both due to content and context-based biases) and 
drift in the covariance terms (El Mouden et al do not mention drift in their article). This is not 
surprising since, as mentioned in section 3, also in the contemporary applications of the Price 
equation to non-cultural (both genetic and phenotypic) evolution, selection and drift are typically 
located in the covariance term (Rice, 2004; Okasha, 2006; Engen and Saether, 2014).  
Both selective and random forces acting upon a population produce a nonzero covariance 
between cultural traits and their contribution to the next generation. While selective forces act 
systematically changing the frequency of cultural variants when these traits causally determine their 
(genetic or cultural) fitness values, random forces produce stochastic fluctuations in the frequency 
of cultural variants when these traits do not causally determine their fitness values. Any process 
based on the relationship between an arbitrary cultural trait and its contribution (i.e., the number of 
descendants of an individual) to the next generation is measured by the covariance term in the Price 
equation. This is why both selective and random forces can be put together under the label of 
“sorting forces”.   
Transmission biases affect the fidelity of transmission of cultural variants. El Mouden et al 
and Aguilar and Akçay explicitly locate mutation, recombination and “individual trials” (i.e., guided 
variation) in the transmission term, which captures any process producing a bias in the transmission 
of a trait from parents to offspring.  
Finally, migration can be considered an ambiguous case. None of the two cultural Price 
equations presented above deals explicitly with migration. Remember that the standard Price 
equation is derived by adopting some assumptions, some more basic than others, about the 
properties of an evolutionary system (see section 3). This equation maps the connection between 
ancestors and descendants, and assumes that all descendants have the same number of ancestors. 
But, if organisms enter into a descendant generation from outside the population (i.e., by migration), 
then these organisms are not connected to any organism of the previous generation. In other words, 
they just appear. Therefore, it would seem that the standard Price equation cannot account for the 
introduction of individuals or cultural traits from outside the modelled population (i.e., we have a 
closed population).13 Some authors have handled this problem by adding an additional term to the 
 
13 Actually, the standard Price equation can be used to model a population with migration, but then 
migration (or dispersal) must be taking place between subpopulations, that are all covered by the 
Price equation (Frank, 1986). That is, the population is closed, but subdivided. Thus, migration can 
be interpreted in two ways: migration between subpopulations within the modelled population 
(which can be modelled with the standard Price equation), or migration in or out of the modelled 
population (which requires further assumptions). The classical Price equation does not cover 
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standard Price equation that measures the degree of connectiveness between ancestral and 
descendant entities (Kerr and Godfrey-Smith, 2009). This new term would allow to represent, in the 
descendant population, unconnected members that arrived via migration.14  
It is interesting to notice, in this regard, that both El Mouden et al and Aguilar and Akçay’s 
formalisms already represent different degrees of connectivity between ancestors and descendants 
through the covariance term. The rationale for this approach is that, in cultural evolution, the 
connections between ancestors and descendant populations depend on the characteristic features of 
social learning. Since different traits may have different cultural fitness, some ancestors can 
culturally influence the descendant individuals in different degrees. Moreover, descendants may 
differ in their number of ancestors. Both circumstances involve variation in connectivity through 
generations, and this phenomenon is captured by the covariance term. Thus, insofar as also 
migration involves variation in the number of ancestors in a population (in this case, zero ancestors 
for immigrated individuals), it could be properly represented in the covariance term. In such a case, 
the extra term proposed by Kerr and Godfrey-Smith would not be needed (see El Mouden et al, 
2014, Supporting Information, p. 2).  
To be precise, both cultural Price equations discussed above explicitly assume that all 
individuals have at least one ancestor (see El Mouden et al, 2014, Supplementing information, p. 1; 
Aguilar and Akçay, 2018, p. 314). This, by definition, implies that they are modelling a closed 
population. In other words, they are not actually dealing with migration. However, our point here is 
just that, in principle, both El Mouden et al and Aguilar and Akçay’s formalisms may handle 
migration via some simple technical modification in the derivation to allow this kind of variation in 
connectivity.15 Be that as it may, researchers always have at their disposal the extra term developed 
by Kerr and Godfrey-Smith in order to handle migration and other processes that affect connectivity 
and are not captured by the weights Υ"!.  
It follows from our discussion that all the forces of cultural evolution may be, in principle, 
suitably located in the Price equation and, thus, that the Price equation is an adequate representation 
 
migration in the second way, but it can in the first way (by thinking the modelled population as a 
meta-population, in which there is migration between subpopulations).  
14 It is also worthy to notice that some transmission biases may create new ideas and behaviours. In 
doing so, these forces are not modifying variation already present in a population but introducing 
new variation. Therefore, technically, they are not affecting the fidelity of transmission between 
ancestors and descendants, but creating new cultural traits that appears without any connection to 
any ancestor. Thus, the forces that provide new variation would be captured by the additional term 
developed by Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2009). 
15 One initial possibility, suggested by Erol Akçay (personal communication), could be to assume 




of the cultural evolutionary dynamics as characterised by dual-inheritance theory. Aguilar and 
Akçay’s formalism is more general and, for this reason, we shall mainly refer to it in the next 
sections. Until now, we focused on the formal suitability of the Price equation to depict cultural 
change; starting from the next section, we shall assess its empirical adequacy and explanatory 
import. 
 
5. The Price equation and the causal characterisation of cultural evolutionary 
processes 
As mentioned in the introduction, even accepting that the conceptual framework of cultural 
evolutionary theory is properly summarised by the Price equation –or, more precisely, by some 
“properly cultural” version of the Price equation, like Aguilar and Akçay’s equation– it may be 
questioned whether this move provides some explanatory or predictive gain. Given the highly 
abstract nature of the Price equation and the fact that it apparently just relates covariances, 
expectations and regressions, it may be argued that the equation is uncapable to provide us with any 
causal knowledge about the phenomena for which it supposedly accounts for. These concerns have 
led some researchers to consider the Price equation just as a priori truth, a “mathematical tautology” 
(van Veelen, 2005; Nowak and Highfield, 2011). If it were indeed the case, the Price equation would 
not be able to play any explanatory or predictive role. In fact, tautologies do not explain anything, 
they are true by definition. In addition, the critics argued that the Price equation by itself lacks of 
dynamic sufficiency to predict the state of the system at any time in the future beyond one 
generation. Frank (2012) and Luque (2017) have extensively responded to these concerns. In this 
context, we shall consider, more specifically, their impact on our picture of cultural evolutionary 
theory.  
It is certainly true that the Price equation –taken as it is– has little empirical significance. If 
we interpret it (as we did in the last section) as a “summary” of the effects of cultural evolutionary 
theory, it is just a consequence law (Sober, 1984). A consequence law has a certain predictive role, 
insofar as it relates certain magnitudes to a specific outcome –the Price equation states that, if the 
two terms on the right-hand side have certain values, then the frequency of the trait under study will 
change correspondingly. However, consequence laws do not say anything about the causes of such 
an outcome and, thus, they are arguably not sufficient to provide an explanation of the phenomena 
under study. 
This conception about the limitations of consequence laws –and, more specifically, of the 
Price equation– is grounded on the presupposition that, when we assess the value of a law within a 
theory, we must evaluate it separately from any other part of the theory. This approach has been 
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repeatedly questioned (see, for instance, Moulines, 1984; Sober, 1988; Díez and Lorenzano, 2013; 
Luque, 2017). The role of consequence laws –or, more precisely, of those consequence laws that 
are assumed to be fundamental– within a theory can be appreciated only if we consider the relation 
between the consequence laws and other elements (laws, models) of the theory.16 
By assuming this perspective, we shall argue, respectively in this and the next section, that: 
 
a. the Price equation is explanatory insofar as, when considered in relation with specific 
cultural evolutionary scenarios, it provides a heuristic guide about the possible causes of the 
phenomena under study; and 
b. it is precisely because this that the Price equation (or, better, a specific cultural version of 
the Price equation, like Aguilar and Akçay’s equation) is a good candidate to be the 
fundamental law, or the guiding-principle (Moulines, 1984; Díez and Lorenzano, 2013), of 
cultural evolutionary theory. 
Not all the philosophers who have discussed the role of the Price equation within evolutionary 
theory have been dismissive about the possibility to derive causal considerations from it. Okasha 
(2006), for instance, offers solutions to various problems related to the levels of selection by 
providing plausible causal interpretations of the Price equation. Furthermore, Otsuka (2016) 
provides a causal interpretation of the Price equation with the help of causal models, and argues that 
this is able to settle the long-standing dispute over the causal or purely statistical character of 
evolutionary theory. 
In order to clarify what kind of causal information can be extracted by the Price equation 
along with a certain description of a cultural evolutionary scenario, we shall start discussing the 
model built by MacCallum, Mauch, Burt and Leroi (MacCallum et al, 2012), whom explicitly 
employ the Price equation to explain the causes of the evolution of music (they adopt the original 
 
16 Some readers may feel uncomfortable with the characterisation of the Price equation as a law. As 
a matter of fact, this is more commonly interpreted as a mathematical theorem concerning the 
relation between the aggregate properties of two sets. We think that the two characterisations need 
not to be at odds. According to the structuralist perspective that we adopt in section 6, laws should 
not be conceived as universal unrestricted empirical generalisations, like in more traditional 
accounts of scientific theories. In particular, all fundamental laws –like Newton’s second law in 
Newtonian mechanics– just denote, if taken alone, set-theoretic structures, like the Price equation. 
What makes these laws empirical is the fact that practitioners assume that portions of the world are 
isomorphic or, more vaguely, similar to those set-theoretic structures. They thus employ these laws 
as guiding principles to discover more restricted regularities (which, as we shall see in section 6, are 
the specialisations of the theory). One of our goals in this paper is precisely to show how cultural 
evolution theory can be profitably developed by assuming that the Price equation (or some version 
of it) is its fundamental law, in the sense we have just sketched out. 
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form of the equation, since they do not take into account genetic factors). From this model, we shall 
derive some general principles for the successful explanatory application of the Price equation to 
cultural evolution. 
MacCallum et al (2012) model music evolution through a simulation, the DarwinTunes, 
which works roughly as follows. The DarwinTunes stores a population of digital genomes, which 
execute looping polyphonic sound sequences. After a certain period of time, loops may replicate to 
produce new loops. This process is the effect of two cultural evolutionary forces: recombination –
i.e., new loops are the product of the random combination of two parents’ genome– and mutation –
i.e., new loops may contain novel rhythmic or melodic features. A selective pressure is then 
introduced via a Web interface, through which a population of consumers listen and rate samples of 
the loops. The consumers’ ratings act as a process of cultural selection due to the content and 
determine the (actual) fitness of the loops; the worst rated loops are retired from the population 
before a new cycle of recombination occurs.  
In one of the experiments with the DarwinTunes, MacCallum and his colleagues used 
costumers’ ratings to estimate the mean fitness of the loops’ population, which they denoted as M, 
the mean absolute musical appeal. The researchers observed that M incremented quickly for the 
first 500-600 generations undergoing selection, but then apparently reached an equilibrium and 
started fluctuating around a mean. How might this phenomenon be explained? Since various 
different forces were acting on the loops’ population (besides recombination, mutation and selection 
due to content, loops also underwent drift, due to stochastic sampling during replication), it was not 
obvious at all which of them was responsible for the evolutionary stasis. It is at this point that the 
Price equation entered the scene.    
The Price equation tells us that, when a population is at evolutionary equilibrium, then 
𝑤"∆𝑧̅ = 0. This is the case if both the covariance and the transmission terms are equal to zero, but 
also –and more interestingly– if the two terms are equal in magnitude but opposite in sign. Since we 
know that there were many evolutionary forces acting in the DarwinTunes before the population 
reached the equilibrium, we are quite justified in believing that we are in the second scenario. 
Through another experiment, MacCallum and his colleagues ascertained that the increment of M 
over the first 500-600 generations was due to cultural selection. This entails that, during this phase, 
cultural selection overcame any possible hidden transmission bias contrasting it. In its turn, this 
reduces to two the possible hypotheses about the subsequent stasis. The first hypothesis is that 
cultural selective pressure suddenly decreased; the second one is that contrasting transmission biases 
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emerged or acquired strength.17 
MacCallum and his colleagues found out –by decomposing M in two further values, CL and 
R, respectively estimating the clarity of the chordal and rhythmic structures, and consequently 
plotting the adaptive landscape of the DarwinTunes– that cultural selection plausibly maintains its 
strength during stasis. This crucially led the researchers to investigate the presence of transmission 
biases opposing cultural selection. By drawing upon an analogy with genetic evolution, MacCallum 
and colleagues noted that “recombination could have increasingly deleterious effects if, as the 
population evolves, high fitness comes to depend on particular genomic configurations that can be 
broken up by sex; in other words, fitness epistasis increases” (2012, p. 12085). As there was 
evidence of synergistic fitness epistasis between CL and R, the authors thus argued that, when the 
population reaches a certain adaptive peak, new adaptive combinations are easily broken up by 
recombination (and mutation). The consequence of this is that, as observed, the adaptive evolution 
suddenly stops. 
We have described at some length the work of MacCallum and his collaborators because we 
think that it is extremely didactic and illustrative of the explanatory and predictive power of the 
Price equation. Of course, as we have conceded to its critics, the Price equation alone is unable to 
detect the causes of the evolutionary change. Nonetheless, when previous knowledge about some 
of the forces already acting in the scenario under study is available, the Price equation provides us 
an invaluable heuristic guide to discover other causes of the evolutionary change (for a similar point, 
see Frank, 2016, pp. 13-14, and Gong et al, 2012, p. 2).  
This is not just the case when 𝑤"∆𝑧̅ = 0 due to an interaction between selection and 
transmission biases, as in the DarwinTunes’ equilibrium, but can be extended to a great variety of 
scenarios. All what is needed –besides, of course, a certain factual knowledge about the specific 
phenomenon being studied– is a proper formal decomposition of the Price equation. Let us clarify 
this point with another example.18 In sections 3 and 4, we have seen that the covariance term of the 
 
17 To be precise, the contrasting force may be another selective pressure. To consider this possibility 
would complicate the discussion of the present case study, and we shall not take it into account. It 
is interesting to notice, nonetheless, that a similar complication can arise in classical mechanics. The 
application of Newton’s second law to a specific scenario is compatible with an infinite number of 
causal decompositions. To account for a certain net force, we can postulate two forces interacting, 
but also 4 forces interacting with half the strength, or 8 forces with a quarter of the strength, and so 
on. While this is certainly a theoretical possibility, in most practical cases we can exclude most of 
the alternative descriptions, thanks to background knowledge or empirical tests. This plausibly 
applies to cultural evolutionary processes as well. At any rate, we briefly discuss how the Price 
equation can model scenarios in which different selective pressures interact at the end of this section.   
18 See also Coulson and Tuljapurkar (2008) and Ozgul et al (2009) for more formal decompositions 
of the Price equation (in this case, in evolutionary ecology). Both studies inform researchers about 
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Price equation is intended to represent both selection and drift. Nonetheless, the two evolutionary 
processes are not explicitly distinguished in the original formulation of the equation. In order to be 
able to measure the magnitude of each force, we have to separate the corresponding term in as many 
terms as we need to account for the phenomenon under study. Thus, for instance, Okasha (2006) 
suggests the following decomposition, splitting up the realised fitness 𝑤" in two parts –i.e., the 
expected fitness 𝑤"∗ and its deviation 𝛿"– of the covariance term: 
 
𝑤"∆𝑧̅ = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑤∗, 𝑧+) + 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛿" 	, 𝑧+) 
 
representing the change due to selection and drift, respectively. In practice, this equation can be 
employed, analogously to the original Price equation in MacCallum et al’s model, to explain (and 
possibly predict) changes in observed dynamics. If, for instance, we observe that in a certain 
population in equilibrium 𝑤"∆𝑧̅ = 0 there are not transmission biases, we know from the modified 
Price equation that, to understand the causes of the phenomenon, we have to look for factors 
reducing selective pressures or, alternatively, factors increasing the stochastic deviation from the 
expectation. 
This explanatory strategy can be further generalised to dynamics that are not in equilibrium 
(that is, in which it is not the case that 𝑤"∆𝑧̅ = 0; Rankin et al, 2015). This can be appreciated by 
focusing on the derivation of the Price equation suggested by Aguilar and Akçay (we repeat it here 





𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤" , 𝑔") +
1
𝑤"
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑠" , 𝑐") + 〈∆𝑔!〉 + 〈∆𝑐!〉 
 
Here, the covariance terms represent the effects of selection in genetic and cultural evolution 
(respectively), and the last two terms represent the transmission bias in both types of evolution. As 
we have seen, in cultural evolution, there are four types of selective forces possibly acting on a 
population: natural selection, cultural selection due to content and cultural selection due to context-
based biases (frequency-dependent selection and selection due to prestige or model). Besides being 
an elegant reformulation of the Price equation aimed to distinguish the effects of natural selection, 
cultural selection due to content and other transmission biases, Aguilar and Akçay’s equation can 
be used to convey useful information about the causes of cultural dynamics. Aguilar and Akçay 
 
causal mechanisms of population change and have been applied to study actual populations (of red 
deer and Soay sheep, respectively).   
 
 18 
themselves work out the details of some of such applications. Take, as illustration, the case in which 
∆?̅? > 0, but 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤" , 𝑔")	and	𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑠" , 𝑐") have different signs. This is an interesting case, in which a 
trait spread in spite of the fact that it is either genetically or culturally unfit.19 Aguilar and Akçay 
show that, in a scenario in which, for instance, a high value of	𝑝 reduces genetic fitness (assuming 
the genetic transmission term is zero), the following inequality must hold true:  
	
𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑠" , 𝑐") > −(𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤" , 𝑔") + 𝑤"〈∆𝑐!〉) 
 
While this inequality is, in general, true regardless whether p reduces or increases genetic fitness 
(e.g., one may deduce that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤" , 𝑔") + 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑠" , 𝑐") > −𝑤"〈∆𝑐!〉, if assumes that 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑤" , 𝑔") is 
positive), Aguilar and Akçay are not just making a mathematical claim. Rather, they aim to provide 
a tool for detecting when genetically maladaptive evolution is acting in a population. The important 
point, as far as we can see, is that, by stating such an inequality, Aguilar and Akçay make explicit a 
relation between different components of fitness in a way that, if certain conditions are observed 
(i.e., the diffusion of a trait in spite of its poor genetic fitness), then certain causal hypotheses must 
be taken into account (e.g., that the diffusion of the trait is due to characteristics that made it 
culturally attractive). Once again, the Price equation reveals its explanatory import in the sense that 
it offers clues about what kind of process we should expect to find acting in a specific scenario, 
given certain background information about the phenomenon under study. 
A last example, this time concerning the action of selection due to context-based biases, can 
be drawn from Gong et al (2012). These authors employ the original Price equation to understand 
the evolution of languages. They are explicit about the fact they use the Price equation as an 
“empirical tool” (Gong et al, 2012, p. 2), that is, as an instrument to detect the influence of selective 
pressures on the diffusion of linguistic variants. Unbiased transmission is computationally modelled 
by Gong and his collaborators using a Pólya-urn model, which simulates a random diffusion of 
linguistic variants in a socially structured population of individuals. This null model is then 
complexified in a variety of ways. In most scenarios, variants are weighted by a factor corresponding 
to the attractiveness of the variant (which is responsible for what we called selection due to content 
biases). However, in some scenarios, the distribution of linguistic variants is also conditioned by the 
presence of individuals with a greater capacity to influence their neighbours. This factor can be, 
quite straightforwardly, interpreted as corresponding to a selective pressure due to prestige (or 
 
19 One of the phenomena most extensively studied by cultural evolutionists, that is, the demographic 
transition in modern Western societies, is precisely a case in which a trait –i.e., the preference for a 




Gong et al calculate the relative strength of selection due to prestige by running two different 
simulations and comparing them. In the first one, the linguistic variants are not subject to selection 
due to content (they are unweighted by the factor denoting the attractiveness of the variant). In this 
scenario, the covariance term of the Price equation is thus measuring only selection due to prestige 
and drift (the latter is already included in the null model). In the second scenario, both kinds of 
selection are acting. The notable result is that, while in the first scenario selection due to prestige 
fails to overcome the inertial fluctuations in the distributions of linguistic variants (i.e., the 
simulation is similar to the one obtained when the null model is run), in the second scenario it 
accelerates or delays the effects of selection due to content (depending on whether the influential 
individuals adopt or reject the most attractive variants). This supports the claim that selection due 
to prestige is indeed a specific kind of cultural selection, which –although, perhaps, not as effective 
as selection due to content– is able to affect the distributions of cultural variants depending on the 
social structure of the population.         
 
6. The Price equation and the structure of cultural evolutionary theory 
In the last section, we have insisted on the heuristic role that the Price equation plays when cultural 
evolutionists aim to identify the causes of a specific cultural dynamic. In this section, we shall 
further support this idea by showing how our previous characterisation of the forces of cultural 
evolution can be integrated within a comprehensive framework. This framework, which –in our 
intentions– should ideally define the structure of cultural evolutionary theory, has the Price equation, 
in its cultural version, at its core. In other words, we believe that the Price equation is, to all effects, 
the fundamental law of cultural evolutionary theory and, in this section, we shall support this claim 
by spelling out the unificatory role that this equation plays within the theory.21 
In order to attain this goal, we will borrow some conceptual tools from metatheoretical 
structuralism (Balzer et al 1987), which is a sophisticated semantic approach to the reconstruction 
 
20 Notice that Gong et al’s terminology is significatively different from the one we adopt in this 
article, and therefore potentially misleading. They, in fact, refer to “prestige variants” in order to 
denote those variants which are weighted by a selective factor that we consider, according to our 
framework, due to content; while they characterise the selective pressures due to prestige simply as 
“individual influence”. Once this terminological divergence is clarified, we find that the underlying 
conceptions are fully compatible.  
21 In similar fashion, Birch (2017) has stressed the unificatory role of a particular form of the Price 
equation, i.e., Hamilton’s rule. In Birch’s view, Hamilton’s rule plays the role of an organising 




of the structure of scientific theories. First of all, thus, we shall introduce some terminology.  
 According to metatheoretical structuralism, mature scientific theories are typically 
composed of a set of theoretical elements arranged in an inverted-tree hierarchy, also called theory 
net. The theoretical elements are set-theoretic structures identifying the models of the theory. The 
notion of model at stake in metatheoretical structuralism is not the intuitive one that we have 
employed so far, but a technical one derived from model theory. In short, we can conceive of the 
models of the theory as those portions of the world that behave according to what is stated by the 
theory. At the top of the hierarchy we usually find a single theoretical element, including some very 
general assertion about the way in which the theory account for a class of phenomena: this is the 
fundamental law. The theoretical elements that branch beneath the top theoretical element are the 
specialisations of the top element: they specify regularities concerning some subclass of the 
phenomena accounted for by the theory.   
 In the case of Newtonian mechanics –to take a classic example– the top theoretical element 
is Newton’s second law. Individually taken, this law is “almost (empirically) vacuous”, in the sense 
that it does little more than providing a definition for the notion of force (Díez and Lorenzano, 
2013). The domain of application of this law is specified by the other theoretical elements of the 
theory –such as the Newton’s third law, the law of gravitation, Hooke’s law, etc.– which are its 
specialisations. This is a possible reconstruction of Newtonian mechanics’ overall structure: 
 
 
FIGURE 1. Structuralist reconstruction of Newtonian mechanics (from Díez and Lorenzano, 2013, p. 1161). 
The specialisations of Newton’s second law are hierarchically represented as follows: the first branching 
distinguishes between space-dependent and velocity dependent forces; the space-dependent forces branch 
into direct and indirect space-dependent forces; direct space-dependent forces branch into linear negative 
space-dependent forces and others; and so forth.  
CM theory-net looks (at a certain historical moment) like follows (only some
terminal nodes are shown here, and in a simplified version, but this suffices for our
present exemplification concerns):
The net has CMGP, Newt n’s second law, as the top unifying nomic component,
and opens down different branches for different phenomena/ xplananda, branches
that can be reconstructed in different steps: first, space-dependent forces versus
velocity-dependent ones; then the space-dependent branch specializes into direct
and indirect space-dependent; direct space-dependent branch specializes in turn into
linear negative space-dependent and…; inverse space-dependent branch specializes
into square inverse and…; at the bottom of every branch we have a totally specific
law that is the version of the guiding principle for a specific phenomenon: pendula,
gravitation, inclined planes, etc. (Kuhn’s ‘‘detailed symbolic expressions’’). Note
that the top–bottom relationship is not one of implication or derivation, but of
specialization in the structuralist sense (Balzer et al. 1987, Chap. IV): bottom laws
are specific versions of top ones, i.e. they specify some functional dependences that
are left partially open in the laws above in the branch.
This brief sketch suffices to clarify the peculiar epistemic status of guiding
principles like CMGP and NSGP. What is crucial, and this was already emphasized
by Kuhn, is that these top general principles cannot be empirically tested ‘‘in
isolation’’: they can be tested, and eventually falsified, only through one of its
specific versions for a specific phenomenon (that is why, after a failed prediction,
one may change the general principle—Kuhn’s revolutions—but can also try to fix
the anomaly by modifying only the specific law—Kuhn’s normal science). In this
sense guiding principles are ‘‘programmatic’’ or heuristic: they tell us the kind of
things we should look for when we want to explain a specific phenomenon. But
taken in isolation, without their specializations, they say empirically very little.
They can be considered, when considered alone, ‘‘empirically non-restrict’’.16
16 This term is Moulines’ (1984); Kuhn uses ‘‘quasi analytic’’ (Kuhn 1976), Dı́ez (2002) ‘‘concept-
constitutive’’ and Lorenzano (2006) ‘‘synthetic a priori’’ (also used in Kuhn 1990). If one thinks that






In spite of its almost vacuous character, Newton’s second law plays nonetheless an invaluable role 
in Newtonian mechanics: it is its guiding principle (Moulines, 1984). The guiding principle of a 
theory establishes “what the theory is about” by providing a very general and comprehensive schema 
for explaining a class of phenomena. As already suggestively noticed by Kuhn (1970), a guiding 
principle (which Kuhn called “generalisation-sketch”) is a promise, rather than a full-fledged 
explanation of any phenomenon. Newton’s second law gained its strength from the fact that it 
inspired generations of physicists to “fill the details” of the theory, by pointing out “where they had 
to look” in order to explain the behaviour of the physical world.  
 Of course, cultural evolutionary theory is not even remotely as “mature” as Newtonian 
mechanics. Thus, we should not expect to find in the former a well-established hierarchy of 
theoretical elements like in the latter. Nonetheless, we think that the Price equation provides to 
cultural evolutionary theory a promise of unification. The taxonomy of forces discussed in section 
2 can be easily integrated into a theory net, analogous to that of Newtonian mechanics, so as to 
represent the structure of cultural evolutionary theory.  
 
FIGURE 2. Tentative reconstruction of cultural dynamics theory net. It can be noticed that we omitted 
migration. Of course, in accordance with our discussion in section 4, migration may be located in different 
branches, depending on the adopted approach. If El Mouden’s et al’s and Aguilar and Akçay’s approach is 
chosen, migration may be considered as a specialisation of sorting forces. If the meta-population approach is 
adopted (see footnote 13), then migration is a transmission bias. Finally, another possibility would be that of 
adding a third major branch (Kerr and Godfrey-Smith’s approach), descending directly from the Price 




As already suggested, the Price equation is analogous to Newton’s second law to the extent that it 
provides a very abstract and general statement about the kind of factors that can produce changes in 
the system under study (in this case, frequencies of cultural variants through time).    
 The relation between the Price equation –or, more properly, the cultural version of the Price 
equation formulated by Aguilar and Akçay– and the other nodes of the theory net should be 
considered as follows. The Price equation offers a mathematical partition between two possible 
kinds of evolutionary change: the change produced by selection, or other sorting forces (such as 
drift), which modify the distribution of a trait; and the change produced by transmission biases, 
which modify the trait itself (by modifying some of its characteristic features). This is to say that all 
the forces of cultural evolution can be formulated either in terms of selection or transmission biases 
(and migration can be incorporated, as we have seen, in different ways depending on our theoretical 
or empirical goals; see also Figure 2 legend). If we assume that the more appropriate formulation of 
the Price equation for cultural evolutionary theory is Aguilar and Akçay’s equation, we may, more 
specifically, say that all cultural evolutionary forces are selective processes or transmission biases 
acting on genetic and cultural variants and their frequencies. There is no evolutionary change 
without these forces acting on a population of traits and, at the same time, there are no other forces 
acting in the evolutionary process besides them. We may say that the cultural Price equation contain 
all the fundamental concepts of the theory. 
 While the Price equation describes the net change in the diffusion of a trait as the product, 
or effect, of forces (remember that it is a consequence law and, thus, it is not –if taken alone– 
causally meaningful), the specialisations of the theory provide overall causal characterisations of 
each force, and these characterisations allow, in their turn, empirical descriptions of the processes 
acting in cultural change.22 Of course, what concretely counts as a specific sorting factor or 
transmission bias in a real-world scenario is different from what counts as a sorting factor or 
transmission bias in another scenario. This is analogous to what occurs in “natural” populations, 
where the way in which natural selection or other evolutionary factors act is strongly dependent on 
the ecological circumstances. Nevertheless, a precise characterisation of the overall causal features 
of the evolutionary factors is what enables, in line with what we have seen in section 5, reliable 
hypotheses about concrete scenarios.    
 Although in most specialisations of the theory one of the terms of the cultural Price equation 
 
22 In the literature there are already good candidates for the mathematical representation of some of 
the specialisations of the theory. We have already mentioned some of them in the previous sections 
of this article. We have chosen not to include them in Figure 2 because we think that, albeit valuable, 
they have not been systematically conceived within a general framework like the one we are 
presenting here and, thus, they are not fully consistent to each other.  
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is equal to zero (this allows to put in the foreground the characteristic features of the single force 
accounted for in each specialisation), the Price equation applies in all of them. The equation has 
such a general range of application precisely thanks to its “empirical emptiness”. This, as argued 
throughout the last two sections, is not a defect, but rather a major strength of the Price equation. 
Thanks to its “almost a priori” and constitutive character, it determines an ideal explanatory pattern 
(Kitcher, 1989) for the specialisations of the theory. In this way, it manages to play a systematiser 
role with respect to the structure of the theory and to coordinate modellers’ effort to provide coherent 
explanations of the phenomena of cultural change.  
 
 7. Concluding remarks 
The Price equation is nowadays used in many areas of biology to represent the processes of 
population change. In spite of –or, we may say, thanks to– its highly abstract way to depict the 
population change, the Price equation provides a powerful conceptual resource. Instead of 
univocally identify the causes of population change (like most equations in population genetics), it 
classifies their common effects in two simple terms. Rather than being directly applicable to model 
specific scenarios, it works as a versatile heuristic tool to formulate new hypotheses about the 
phenomena under study, as well as to find out new equations describing these more specific 
scenarios. The Price equation can be considered the fundamental law of evolution (Luque, 2017; 
Queller, 2017; Luque and Baravalle, 2021) insofar as it does not commit us to any unequivocal view 
about the causes of evolution, but it identifies those concepts and dynamical features that any 
evolutionary approach to a certain domain of phenomena must assume. 
 Cultural evolutionary theory is an expanding area of research. While it is broadly intended 
–as its name itself states– as an evolutionary theory and cultural evolutionary theorists commonly 
employ formal tools derived from population genetics, little effort has been paid to define the 
underlying principles connecting cultural evolutionary models. In this article, we have argued that 
cultural evolutionary theory is an evolutionary theory because the forces of cultural evolution (as 
usually conceptualised in dual-inheritance theory) can be easily plugged in a theoretical structure in 
which a specific cultural version of the Price equation is the fundamental law. As well as in other 
domains of evolutionary theory, the Price equation works in cultural evolutionary theory as a 
heuristic principle, providing a guide to the formulation of explanations of specific phenomena (as 
we have seen in section 5) and a unifying framework to think cultural evolutionary processes 
collectively (as we have argued in section 6). 
 Our aim with this work has been to suggest that, in spite of the fact that cultural evolutionary 
theory is frequently presented as a quite heterogenous set of models, there are no reason to be too 
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pessimistic about its theoretical unity. The Price equation provides the key to integrate different 
factors producing cultural change and accumulation in a coherent picture. Albeit the details of our 
metatheoretical reconstruction are purely tentative, and may be certainly improved, we are 
convinced that the future developments of cultural evolutionary theory will confirm the foundational 
and systematiser role that the Price equation plays in it.  
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